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INTERPATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

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The Intermedian Unch

As the CA voted to edjourn on 11 December and reconvens next April in Bor York, it approved that detica on Polestine and probably Roros could examine the Accordly agende for this year. Referral of the Poleutino quotion to a three men Conciliation Commission was approved by the Control Ascembly's Political Committee after it deleted reference to ofther the Bernadotte or the Partition Plan as guides. However, it is questionable whother even such a wook resolution will be approved. The Ad Hoc Political Committee recommended over Slav objections specific voluntary restrictions on the use of the veto in the Security Council. In another Soviet defeat, the Interio Committee received a new lease on life for one year. In the Berlin Lispute the Western Powers recounted to the SC "noutrals" recent measures of the USSR accentuating the split in the Berlin city edministration, thus indicating how these had multiplied the difficulties in adjusting the currency question. refusing to hear a North Korean delegation and subsequently seating the South Koreans, the GA Political Committee took a double slap at the Soviet bloc. Kymon rights and genocide proposals get Committee approval.

Palestine prospectus. The nurrow margin (25-21) by which the CA Political Committee adopted the emasculated version of US-UK Palestine proposal makes it doubtful whether even this tenuous contribution can muster the two-third's rejority necessary for passage in the GA plenary. The Committee resolution merely shunts the embroglio over to a threeman concilhation commission stripped of all terms of reference. If the GA fails to pass some such resolution, it may marely continue the functions of the Mediator.

Paradoxically, the defeat of the moderate Anglo-American "third force" was effected by a weird coalition made up of die-hard supporters of partition (the Soviet bloc) on the one hand and of the Arab states and Isrcali friends on the other. Through their intransigeance, the Arabs have again missed the opportunity to support a solution which, while recognizing the emistence of Israel, might, by defining to some extent the Israeli dozain, have served at least to limit the Arab loss. Whather the GA finally adopts or rejects the innocuous resolution

cmorging from the Political Committee will exercise little or no effect Document No. on the situation in the Holy Land. In either case, whatever fait accompli NO CHANGE in Class.

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has been brought about by military might is likely to prevail. Such a result will suit the Jews to a tee. King Abdullah, impatient with the Political Committee's rejection of Mediator Bernadotte's recommendation that the Arab portion of Palestine go to Transjordan, may accept the situation and make an agreement with Tel Aviv. Backed by his efficient Arab Legion, which seems to have entered into a virtual armistice with the Jews, Abdullah is unlikely to allow himself to be stymied much longer by a strife-torn Egypt and Syria.

However, the present precarious military equilibrium in Palestine might again be upset by the results of the January Israeli elections. Should the extremist Rebrew Freedom Novement, led by Irgumist Menahim Beigin, show unexpected strength at the polls, fresh danger will arise that the revisionist faction may get out of hand and precipitate new military adventures. Nothing that the GA is likely to accomplish before adjournment would discourage such an unfortunate development.

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Effects of GA adjournment. The consequence of the GA's decision to adjourn until next April leaving uncompleted its work on items such as Palestine and the Italian colonies, is to prolong uncertainty and confusion. From the attempt of the Slav group to put over all unfinished business until the next regular session in September 1949, it is apparent that the Soviet bloc well appreciated that further postponement would increase that confusion which of itself appears to the USSR as a desirable political objective. If the GA can reach any decision at all on Palestine before adjournment, it will not go beyond a weak and incomplete resolution leaving most of the most points hanging fire. Under these circumstances the Palestine question may well come up again in April. The question of the Italian colonies is almost certain to go over to the April meeting. Both of these postponements will contribute to the prolongation of political uncertainties and will serve to increase unrest among the Moslems of North Africa and of the Near East.

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IRO may take on political refugees from Balkan Satellites. The recent Greek request that the International Refugee Organization accept responsibility for the political refugees from Bulgaria and other satellite states currently crossing Greece's northern border may meet with favorable response. Increased pressure on the IRO to prevent the involuntary return of these refugees to their country of origin resulted from the statement of the Athens Government that it would be unable to care for them after 1 December. Should the IRO turn down this request, the US representative will seek to have the decision reversed. In the meantime, the Greek Government will be urged to continue receiving the refugees on a temporary basis.



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Effect of postponement on Italian colonies. The GA decision to adjourn until April will increase tension among the various claimants to the Italian colonies and their adherents but will afford the US and UK an opportunity to reassess their position and perhaps to reach a series of agreements that will avoid a vote unfavorable to their interests. Stiffening opposition to US-UK advocacy of a one-year postponement of a final solution on Tripolitania may cause them either to change their position on Italy's participation or at least expand their position to cover postponement on all Libya. Either solution would have the support of the Latin American states, which have now decided to barter Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania against a British trusteeship for Cyrenaica. and of the European nations supporting Italian aspirations. The British, plagued by the financial burden of administering all three colonies, favor settling the colonies question as soon as possible. They will therefore endeavor in the spring **to get a final solution on Somaliland and Eritrea despite a possible disagreement on Libya. Should the desired solution not be forthcoming, the UK might attempt unilaterally to carry out any settlement which appears to have majority (even though short of two-thirds) Assembly support.** Although the return of Somaliland to Italy appears to meet with the approval of most GA members, the proposed cession to Ethiopia of southern Eritrea, including the cities of Asmara and Massawa, has not been as cordially received.

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Pavorable UN action on Korea expected. The GA Political Committee's consideration of the Korean case commenced with the 34-6 rejection of the participation of a Communist North Korean delegation in the discussion. Prospects for the passage of a resolution calling for the recognition of the Secul Government, the withdrawal of all occupation forces and the establishment of a commission to help bring together the northern and southern zones are excellent. Anti-US propaganda blasts from the Slav bloc have already begun, but will not alter the final vote which will probably follow the overwhelming pattern of previous 1948 Soviet defeats. Since UN members now seem more or less in agreement on the type of recognition to be extended the Rhee regime, the most thorny issue involved in the case appears to be the composition of the new commission. Returning the original commission has the disadvantage of involving some mediocre personnel, some delegates cowed by the proximity of the USSR and all weary of the Seoul atmosphere. Although likely, the appointment of a new commission carries with it the problem of educating the delegates to local conditions and problems.

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Asiatic countries discouraged over ECAFE. The US Delegation to the current conference of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reports that an atmosphere of pessimism has resulted from the US statement that no large scale "Marshall Flan" for Asia is possible.

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Although recognizing the reasonableness of the US position, most Asiatic delegates are questioning what ECAFE can do in the industrial development field without substantial US aid. The US Delegation considers it possible that ECAFE may disintegrate through loss of interest on the part of the Asiatic members who have looked on ECAFE largely as a vehicle for securing US economic assistance.

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Cracks lose seat in UNTSCO Executive Body. An expanding Communist drive to replace non-Communists still representing the Satellite Governments with militant "hard-core" Communists was reflected last week when the re-election of the Czech nember of UNTSCO's Executive Board was proposed. Informed that the retiring Czech member, a Social Democrat, was not available, the Board was asked to accept in his place Hoffmeister, a top Ministry of Information official currently serving as Czech Ambassador to France. This official, known to have spearheaded the Czech campaign to make the Western press responsible for Masaryk's death, was nominated by Belgium which argued for continued representation for "a type of government which has appeared in Prague and elsewhere". The Board's refusal to accept his nomination and its decision to give Czechoslovakia's seat to Italy indicates the unlikelihood that UNESCO will tolerate efforts to exploit UNESCO for Communist propaganda of the type broadcast at the recent World Congress of Intellectuals.